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Abstract
In this paper, an attempt is made not only to establish the inextri-
cable link between the social contract and the notion of justice, but also to
emphasize their importance to democracy and as a means of achieving the
Prajna Vihara, Volume 12, Number 1, January-June, 2011, 1-15 1
2000 by Assumption University Pressc
~
goals of development in Africa. In examining the relationship between
social contract and justice, the paper asserts that our every day dealing
with others at various layers of existence is underpinned by the notion of a
contract, whether explicit or implicit and that such dealings are meant
primarily to facilitate some measure of justice and to foster development
in human society. While accepting democracy as the best means for achiev-
ing the goals of development, the paper concludes that the reason most
African states have not made giant developmental strides, despite their
practice of democracy, is because their leaders are yet to accept democ-
racy as a form of contract that carries with it, serious implications border-
ing on the question of justice.
Introduction
Contractual models have come to inform a vast vari-
ety of relations and interaction between
persons....[Therefore] contemporary...society is in the
grip of contractual thinking”1 - Virginia Held
The idea of contract is as old as man himself. From the creation
story in the holy books of most religions, the view that man’s enjoyment of
even his natural rights is dependent upon some form of contract or agree-
ment between him and his creator is very prevalent. In most accounts, the
idea of a contract, whether explicit or implicit plays a significant role in our
every day dealings with others. Fundamental however to all contractual
arrangements is the central role occupied by the notion of justice. In fact,
it can rightly be asserted that the essence of entering into any form of
contract is to facilitate some measure of justice, whether in a social group,
a religious organisation, an educational institution, a political association, a
business cartel or even the society at large. In this paper, attempt is made
not only to establish the central role justice occupies in all contractual
arrangements but also to draw the inextricable link between social
contract, justice and social development. Our argument is that all our
dealings with ‘others’ at various layers of existence amount to an
attempt to reconcile various interests guided by some presumption of
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a contract, whether implicit or explicit, and since development is always
the raison d’e^tre of all contractual arrangements, it follows that all our
dealings with others not only have contractual underpinnings, such deal-
ings are meant primarily to foster development in human society. While
accepting democracy as the best means for achieving the goals of devel-
opment, the paper concludes that the reason many African states have not
made giant developmental strides is because their leaders are yet to ac-
cept democracy as a form of contract that carries with it, serious implica-
tions bordering on the question of justice, whenever the terms of the con-
tract (represented by the principles of democracy) are not followed to the
letter. But, first, let us start with a historical excursion on the relationship
between social contract and the notion of justice.l
Social Contract and the Idea of Justice in the Ancient Period
Although the Social Contract Theory is usually associated with
modern moral and political theorists like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, philosophers before and after these, also
gave elaborate attention to discussing the idea of a social contract. Cen-
tral however to all discussions on social contract is the fundamental posi-
tion occupied by the notion of justice.
In one of the early dialogues of Plato called Crito,2 Socrates used
a social contract argument to explain to Crito why he must remain in prison
and accept the death penalty rather than escape and go into exile in an-
other Greek city as Crito and some of his friends had planned. In his
argument, Socrates attempted to explain the reason he had an overwhelming
obligation to obey the laws of Athens even at the cost of his own life.
Starting from the premise that his entire way of life and existence has been
made possible by the laws of Athens, Socrates then explains his relation-
ship with the laws of Athens as representing some sort of contract be-
tween him as a citizen and Athens as a state. In fact, the terms of this
contract are spelt out in the laws of Athens. In some circumstances, a
social contract is explicitly consented to by the parties, whereas in some
other cases, the consent may be merely implied. In the specific case of
Socrates, the contract between him and the city of Athens is an implied
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one, since he had enjoyed all the benefits and facilities provided by the
state, and has abided by the laws and accepted the punishments they
mete out since his youth, even though he was not one of the original con-
tractors. This forms the framework of Socrates understanding of the no-
tion of justice. Having implicitly consented to the contract that the laws of
Athens represent, Socrates is therefore under obligation to keep the terms
of the contract, even at the expense of losing his own life. This is Socrates’
understanding of justice. So, the notion of justice for Socrates has its
foundation in the idea of a social contract.
Also, in another of Plato’s dialogues, the Republic,3 a social con-
tract explanation is presented for the nature of justice. Here, justice is said
to be the conventional result of the laws and covenants that men make in
order to avoid two extremes. The first is to avoid a situation where men
are able to commit injustice with impunity and the second is to avoid
becoming victims of injustice themselves. Men therefore contracted among
themselves that in order to avoid the inconveniences of these extremes, it
will be in their own best interests to enter into a covenant by enacting laws
that will regulate conducts and promote a sense of justice. In another
expression from the Republic, the concept of justice is explained in terms
of three different kinds of interests, virtues and personalities in individuals
and the three different kinds of social classes that should reflect these
three personalities, interests and virtues. Justice here is seen as consisting
in each person falling into the class to which he belongs and each class
performing those duties for which it is best fitted.4
From the views expressed above in Crito and the Republic, the
notion of justice is intricately tied to the idea of a social contract and
justice consists not only in obedience to the state and the laws that sustain
it, as explained in Crito, but also in the state of a well-regulated soul or a
just man who will, among other things, recognize his obligation to the state
and fellow humans by performing those duties for which his is best fitted.
Social Contract and the Idea of Justice in the Modern Period
The idea of social contract received the widest attention in the
modern period in the history of philosophy through the writings of Thomas
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Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1712-1778).
Thomas Hobbes lived during the most crucial period in England’s
history, which is the period of the English Civil War. The war was occa-
sioned by the clash between the King and his supporters who preferred
the traditional authority of a monarch, and the Parliamentarians, who de-
manded more power for the Parliament. Hobbes tried to mediate in this
conflict through reflection on the origin and nature of political authority as
well as the obligation of self-interested individual members of society.
Hobbes’ reflections are detailed out in his seminal work, Leviathan.5
In the Leviathan, Hobbes started his analysis with an assessment
of those universal natural qualities of man as a special kind of animal.
Man, he explained, is necessarily and exclusively egoistic and self-inter-
ested. All men, he argued, pursue only what they perceive to be in their
own individually considered best interests - they are drawn to that which
they desire and are repelled by that to which they are averse. From there,
he extended his analysis to a consideration of what it is like for men with
distinct natural qualities to live and interact with one another, and then
extrapolated the logical consequences of such interaction.6 All of these
combined to form his idea of the state of nature; a condition where natu-
rally and exclusively self-interested men jostle for limited resources, and
where there is no power to moderate their excesses. Given these condi-
tions, Hobbes concludes that the state of nature would be unbearably
brutal; a state of perpetual and unavoidable war. In fact, he describes it as
the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the
rather unfortunate consequences arising from this form of co-existence
that necessitated the construction of a body polity or state, where such
inconveniences are expected to be taken care of.
The construction of such body polity or state is done through a
social contract. This contract is constituted by two distinguishable con-
tracts. First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and recip-
rocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the state of
nature.
It is this mutual renouncing of rights that Hobbes refers to as ‘cov-
enant’.7 However, if a man merely gives up his right of governing himself,
on the promise that others would do likewise, others might just fail to
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keep their own part of the agreement. The ‘signing’ of a covenant by men
is therefore not enough for achieving the desired goal; for such covenant
would still depend on its implementation, on the same self-free, equal and
passionate being as we have in the state of nature.
There must therefore be a force behind the agreement that makes
the pains of breaking it outweigh the pains of keeping it.8 This common
force is created in a second contract by the entire people, by conferring all
their powers upon one man or assembly of men, to whom they surrender
all their basic natural rights to govern themselves. In other words, to en-
sure their complete escape from the state of nature, they must agree to live
together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism
for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. Prior to the establish-
ment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live
together and the contract to embody a sovereign with absolute authority,
nothing is immoral or unjust __ anything goes! This means that questions
regarding justice or injustice had no place in human existence prior to the
contract that created the state or society. In the social contract, says
Hobbes, lies the foundation and origin of justice; for without the contract,
no right can be said to have been transferred and every man still has the
right to everything or whatever he so wishes, but once a contract is made,
to break it becomes unjust. Injustice then means the non-performance of
a covenant or contract.9 In other words, it is the performance of one's
covenant that gives room for distinguishing between a just and an unjust
act.  Since the sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete
out punishments for breaches of the contract, which are worse than not
being able to act as one pleases, men have good, albeit self-interested,
reason to adjust themselves to the artifice of morality in general, and jus-
tice in particular, which are the very essence of the contract.
The social contract is seen by Hobbes as the most fundamental
source of all that is good and just. Our choice, according to him, is either
to maintain justice by abiding by the terms of the contract, or prescind
from our obligations regarding the contract and thereby arrive by abstrac-
tion, at another layer of atomic individualism which is rooted in the human
passions, where questions of justice and injustice make no meaning.
In his Two Treatises of Government,10 John Locke also postu-
lates a ‘state of nature’, which is however, neither chaotic nor anarchical.
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In the Lockean ‘state of nature’, men lived peacefully and own private
properties like cattle, sheep and land. Locke maintains that men by nature
are not wholly selfish, for they sometimes co-operate and work for the
good of others, even though sometimes, they also act egoistically. Occa-
sionally however, men, he admits, transgress by attempting to kill or steal
someone’s property. When this occurs, the injured party has right to pun-
ish the transgressor, because in the state of nature, there is no civil author-
ity or government to punish people for transgressions against laws. Locke
further argues that there would have been no reason for men to covenant
to leave the state of nature to form society, except that difficulties arise in
applying punishment to the transgressors and ensuring justice. Political
society therefore came into being when individual men contracted together
in the state of nature to give up the executive power to punish those who
transgress the laws of nature. People entered into the contract with the
sole aim of developing such institutions as necessary for the purpose of
punishing transgressors and administering justice in the society.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s accounts of the moral and political evo-
lution of human beings from a state of nature to modern society are laid
out in his essay titled, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men.11 According to Rousseau, the State of Nature
was a peaceful and quixotic one where people lived solitary, uncompli-
cated lives. Their few needs were easily satisfied by nature because of the
abundance of nature and the small size of the population and so, they had
less reason for conflict. As time passed by and as population started in-
creasing, humanity started facing certain changes, resulting in discoveries,
public values and the invention of private properties. All these led to envy,
pride, greed, competition and contempt.
In his The Social Contract,12 Rousseau attempted to respond to
this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have
been produced by these developments. The fundamental question that
bothered Rousseau concerns how we can live together without succumb-
ing to the force and coercion of others. For Rousseau, we can do this by
submitting our individual, particular wills to the collective or general will,
created through agreement or contract with other free and equal persons.
This act, whereby individual persons come together as a people through
contract to choose a sovereign is, according to Rousseau, “the real foun-
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dation of society”.13 Fundamental to this version of the social contract is
the idea of reciprocated duties: the sovereign is committed to the good of
the individuals who constitute it, and each individual is likewise committed
to the good of the whole by fulfilling their duties to the sovereign. The
individuals' fulfilment of their duties as well as the sovereign’s commitment
to the good of the individual amounts to justice in this context. From the
views expressed above by the modern theorists, the notion of justice is
inextricably tied to that of the social contract. In fact, discussions on the
question of justice would not have come up, if men didn’t enter into con-
tract in the first instance.
Social Contract and the Idea of Justice in the Contemporary Pe-
riod
The relationship between the social contract and the notion of
justice is more forcefully established in John Rawls’ version of the
social contract theory.14 Essentially, John Rawls’ theory which is con-
tained in his book, A Theory of Justice, is a general theory of social
justice, which includes not just principles of justice but a very elaborate
edifice supporting these principles.  Rawls takes the subject of his prin-
ciples of justice to be what he calls “the basic structure of society”,15
whose major function is to distribute the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation among members of society.16  Unfortunately, Rawls observes
that the basic structure of most societies favours some starting places over
others in the division of the benefits of social cooperation, thereby result-
ing in some form of inequalities.  For Rawls, therefore, the primary prob-
lem of justice is to fashion out a set of principles, which would not only
provide a way of assigning fundamental rights and duties to the ‘major
social institutions’ of society, but would also lay down how the basic struc-
ture should distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.17
The question now concerns how such principles of justice that
would regulate the basic structure of society would be chosen.  This
is where Rawls makes use of the social contract theory.  Rawls’ social
contract is that of a situation in which people come together to draw up
principles to regulate their society. He calls this situation, the ‘original po-
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sition’. Central to Rawl’s idea of social contract, which marks him out
from other contractarians before him, is the notion of the ‘veil of igno-
rance’. The veil of ignorance is a hypothetical construct used by Rawls to
show how persons in the original position are denied knowledge of their
particular abilities, talents and social positions they would occupy in the
society.  This not only puts all the contractors on equal moral standing, it
ensures that none of them has any advantageous bargaining power over
others.  Rawls’ central argument here is that if people are ignorant of those
things that prejudiced them directly or indirectly in their favour, as the
situation in the original position allows, they would not endorse a principle
that favours one party at the expense of another, since, once the veil of
ignorance is lifted, they might find themselves on the losing end of such a
principle.
Rawls proposes two main principles of social justice that should
regulate every well-ordered and just society.  These principles, ac-
cording to Rawls, are that:
(i) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
(ii) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both:
a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and
b. attached to offices and positions open to all under con-
ditions of fair equality of opportunity.18
The first principle is called the ‘liberty principle’.19 This principle
consists of two claims.  First is that all members of society are to have the
greatest liberty consistent with a similar liberty for others.  The second
claim of this principle is that this total system of basic liberties is to be as
extensive as possible.  What Rawls means here is that these liberties are
inalienable and are to be enjoyed by everyone in the society, in a manner
that will not prevent some others in the society from enjoying the same
liberties. The second principle is also of two parts.  The first part, which
states that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged or worst-off group in society, is known as
the ‘difference principles’. What this principle demands is that the basic
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structure should be arranged in such a way that any inequality, in terms of
prospects of obtaining the primary goods, must work to the advantage of
those members of society who are worst-off with respect to these pri-
mary goods.
The second part of the second principle is known as the ‘principle
of fair equality of opportunity’.20 The principle states that people with
identical skills, abilities and talents enjoy equal opportunities. In this re-
spect,
If we have two people ‘X’ and ‘Y’ with similar skills and
talents and they both desire to attain a position which
requires technical training.  X comes from a wealthy fam-
ily and the family of X is willing to sponsor him for his
training.  But in the case of Y, he comes from a poor
background, so the family cannot pay for his training.
The principle of fair equality of opportunity would re-
quire that the society should finance the training of Y who
comes from a poor background, so that he is not de-
prived of opportunities available to others with similar
skills or talents.21
A just society for Rawls, therefore, is one in which the basic social
institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy the prin-
ciples of justice enumerated above.
In his book, Morals by Agreement,22 published in 1986, David
Gauthier outlined his own account of social contract. Gauthier agreed
with other contractarians that society and morality are founded upon
an agreement between exclusively self-interested yet rational persons.
But whereas theorists like Hobbes and Locke insisted that an external
enforcement mechanism in the form of a sovereign was necessary to
enforce justice, Gauthier believed that such external mechanism was
not necessary, as rationality alone convinces persons not only to agree to
cooperate, but to ensure justice, by sticking to the terms of their agree-
ments. Justice for him therefore consists in acting cooperatively and in
being consistent with acting cooperatively by sticking to the terms of one’s
agreements at all times.
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Gauthier appealed to the allegory of the prisoner’s dilemma to
show that self-interested and rational persons can be consistent with act-
ing cooperatively. This narrative involves two persons who have been
brought in separately for questioning by the police, for a crime they are
both suspected to have committed. Each prisoner is promised a chance of
a lesser jail term if he cooperates and gives information on the other pris-
oner. Gauthier reasoned that in order to serve his own interests as much
as possible, each prisoner is better off cooperating with the police by
confessing, no matter what the other prisoner does. The important lesson
from the prisoner’s dilemma is that when one is engaged in interaction
such that others’ actions can affect one’s own interests, and vice versa,
one does better if one acts cooperatively. Acting cooperatively and being
consistent with doing this, is Gauthier’s idea of justice.
Our analysis so far tries to draw the nexus between justice and
social contract. It tries to establish that the raison d’e^tre behind every
contractual arrangement is the establishment of the necessary conditions
that can engender development. But such conditions can only be created
where justice is given its prime place. This is the reason the analysis of the
question of justice is inextricably tied to that of the social contract. Al-
though, the question of what constitute justice has remained a significant
one and has bothered philosophers right from the time of Plato, we can,
from our analysis so far, identify different criteria that represent the various
positions by philosophers down the ages, on what constitute justice. These
criteria range from that of need, desert, and right, to equality. The criterion
of need states that justice is done to people when their needs are met. This
position is well expressed in Karl Marx’s The Gotha Programme,23 where
he enunciated that the distribution of the social goods in the communist
state would be according to need.  This is captured by his famous and
much quoted aphorism: “from each according to his ability and to each
according to his needs”.24 The criterion of rights states that justice consists
in respecting the rights of people in society.  Advocates of this view in-
clude J.S. Mill, John Locke and Robert Nozick. Whereas J.S. Mill con-
tends, for instance, that every claim of justice is a claim of individual right
and that an individual is justly treated when his rights are respected,25
Robert Nozick argues that people have property rights and that it would
be morally indefeasible and unjust for such properties to be taken away
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through any means. The criterion of desert states that justice is done to a
person when he is given what he deserves. Finally, the criterion of equality
states that justice consists in treating everyone equally.
Although the view has been expressed that each of the criteria of
need, right, desert and equality embodies important aspects of justice,
yet, none of them sufficiently explain the meaning of justice. All the criteria
cannot be taken together, as this would amount to incorporating into the
concept of justice, some other claims not relevant to the determination of
what is just at some particular point in time. In view of the variety of
circumstances to which matters of justice are applied, however, some
have insisted that the criterion relevant to the determination of what is just
or unjust should be a function, both of the kind of issue being assessed
and of the circumstances in which the assessment is taking place.26 This,
we must warn, may make the meaning of justice not only contextual and
relative but also situational. Our primary interest here, however, is not
with these controversies or how they are resolved but with showing how
a consideration of any or all of these criteria can help in our determination
of issues of justice from time to time.
Social Contract, Justice and Development in Africa
So far in this paper, attempt has been made to establish the link
between social contract and the notion of justice. From our examination,
we can rightly assert that our every day dealing with others at various
layers of existence is underpinned by the notion of a contract, whether
explicit or implicit and that such dealings are meant primarily to facilitate
some measure of justice and to foster development in human society. The
aim of social contract therefore is to create the enabling conditions for
realising the goals of development, but such conditions can only be cre-
ated where justice is given its prime place. That there is an indispensable
link between justice and the establishment of the type of environment that
can engender development is attested to, by the preamble to the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation’s constitution which states that development is
only sustainable where there is “universal and lasting peace” but that these
can only be established in an environment where justice is given the prime
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place.27 In fact, philosophers, right from the time of Plato, have all
emphasised the fact that justice is a prerequisite for peace and stability
and that peace and stability are indispensable conditions for development.
It is true that as individuals, we pursue our different interests at various
levels, but by virtue of the fact that we live in societies where we can serve
each other’s interests by our actions, it becomes pertinent to regulate at all
times our relationship with others, guided by some presupposition of a
contract and the notion of justice. This, however, is where leaders of states
in Africa miss the point and the very reason they fail to deliver the common
good and engender development, even with the most effective instrument.
From the views of the contractarians examined so far, the existence of
government has been justified solely in terms of its ability to secure the
common good of all within the state, and most contemporary scholars
have argued in favour of democracy as the form of government that can
best help secure the common good.  This is because, democracy places
power in the hands of the people. It holds that all people have something
good to offer in the governance of their shared political space and that
through their collective efforts and contributions, the common good is
better secured, improved and promoted. Although a few people end up
playing active roles in the day to day running of a democracy, the faith in
democracy as a principle of governance is that:
Sovereignty ultimately lies with the people and is only
exercised on their behalf by a few within a body of rules,
predetermined and agreed upon by both parties -
the ruler and the ruled - for the benefit of the polity, its
affairs, the common good and well-being of its citizens
and future generations.28
This means that democracy, by its very principle, is a form of
contract, in fact, a contract of a more flagitious tang, with serious implica-
tions for both the present and future generations. Therefore, it can be said
that democracy, if it is to function as a valuable means for enhancing de-
velopment, must be understood as a form of contract, and should not
betray this theoretical basis, as is currently the case in many of the states in
Africa. The experiments with democracy in many of the states in Africa
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belie a ‘breach of contract’ and a gross neglect of the issue of justice,
resulting in the very many tensions, conflicts, violence and other vices that
pose as hindrances on our paths to development. Africa can only begin to
make giant developmental strides when its leaders accept democracy as a
form of contract. This would mean that there would be serious implica-
tions whenever the terms of the contract (in matters of justice) are not
followed to the letter. The idea of a contract has been and will undoubt-
edly remain with us for the foreseeable future, but so too is the notion of
justice. These are essential concepts that will continue to compel us to
always keep the terms of our collective contract, by rethinking as Socrates
did in Crito, the nature of both ourselves, our laws and of our relations
with others, as we travail on our democratic journeys. This is the only way
we can together create an enabling environment that can engender devel-
opment in our various societies and in the world at large.
Endnotes
1Virginia Held, Feminist Morality, Transforming Culture Society and
Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
2See: Plato Five Dialogues, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Pub-
lishing Company, 1981.
3Plato Republic, Translated by G.M.A. Grube and Revised by C.D.C.
Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
4Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Elements of Philosophy, An Introduction, New
York: McGraw Hill, 1993, p.36.
5Hobbes Leviathan, Edited by C.B. Macpherson, England: Penguin Books,
1968.
6Francis Offor, ‘A Philosophical Perspective an Globalization and the
Quest for a Stable World Order’, Unpublished  Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the
Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, February, 2005, p.138.
7Hobbes Leviathan p.192.
8Ibid., p.196.
9David Gauthier “Hobbes” in Robert L. Arington (ed.), A Companion to
the Philosophers, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999, p.307.
10John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1963.
11See: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, Trans. Donald
A Cress, Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.
12Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Harmondsworth: Pen-
14 Prajna Vihara~
_ _
guin, 1968.
13Mon Chek Min “Social Contract Theory"http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/soc-
cont.htm.
14John Rawls, A. Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
15Ibid., p.54.
16Dipo Irele, Introduction to Contemporary Social and Political Think-
ers, Ibadan: New Horn, 1993, p.14.
17Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.2.
18Rawls is cited in Gardner Michael R. “Rawls on the Maximum Rule
and Distribute Justice”, Philosophical Studies, 27, 1975,  pp. 255 - 256.
19Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.61.
20Dipo Irele, op. cit., p.16.
21Ibid., p.17.
22David Gauthier, Morals by Agreements, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986.
23See: Dipo Irele, op. cit., p.102.
24Ibid.
25See: A.B. Ekanola ‘Peace and the Problems of Justice in Contemporary
Society’, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of
Ibadan, Nigeria, 2002.
26Ibid.
27David A. Morse “ILO and the Social Infrastructure of Peace” in
Haberman (ed.), Nobel Lecturers: Peace, Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing  Com-
pany, 1972, p.438.
28T. D. Oladipo, “Apathy and the Future of Nigeria’s Democracy” Re-
flections, Vol.6, 2008, p.23.
Francis Offor 15
